The Property Interest in Social Security Benefits by Lewis, James P.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 4 Article 6
The Property Interest in Social Security Benefits
James P. Lewis
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Social Welfare Law Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
James P. Lewis, The Property Interest in Social Security Benefits, 21 Md. L. Rev. 331 (1961)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol21/iss4/6
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
the Act, and there have been repeated expansions of the
geographical exceptions.58  Since the Bouse Act applies
only to misdemeanors, its exclusionary rule is, of course,
inapplicable to felonies.59 The effect of the Mapp case is to
establish a constitutional exclusionary rule for uncon-
stitutionally seized evidence, so that the exception of the
Bouse Act of felonies is at most applicable only to evidence
constitutionally but illegally seized. Inasmuch as the con-
sistent judgment of the Maryland legislature over more
than a quarter of a century since the enactment of the
Bouse Act has been that its exclusionary rule should be
restricted rather than expanded, the Mapp case marks a
rather sharp break with Maryland policy.
The Property Interest In 'Social 'Security Benefits
By James P. Lewis
The American people, and attorneys in particular, have
in the past few years taken an increasing interest in
"Social Security," and especially in that part of the Social
Security program consisting of Federal old-age, survivor's,
and disability insurance.' Although this larger program
8 The result is ,the following situation:
1. Prosecutions for unlawfully carrying concealed weapons are ex-
cepted in all the counties and in Baltimore City. Mason v. Wright-
son, 205 Md. 481, 109 A. 2d 128 (1954) ; 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35,
§ 5(b).
2. Prosecutions for violations of gambling laws in Sections 237 to
263, inclusive, of Article 27 of the Maryland Code are excepted in
Anne Arundel County, Howard County, 'Prince George's Cbunty, Cecil
County, Wicomico County, Worcester County, Kent County, and Talbot
County. In Montgomery County prosecutions for violations of the
gaming law in Section 240 of Article 27 are excepted. 4 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 35, § 5(c).
3. Prosecutions for violation of the lottery laws in Sections 356
to 371, inclusive, of Article 27 of the Maryland Code are excepted in
Montgomery County, Prince George's County, Howard County,
Wicomico County, Worcester County, Kent County, and Talbot County.
4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 5(d).
4. Prosecutions for violation of the alcoholic beverage laws in
Article 2B of the Maryland Code are excepted in Wicomico County,
Kent County, and Talbot County. 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 6.
5. Prosecutions for violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act
[3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 284] are excepted in all of the counties
and in Baltimore City. Price v. Warden, 215 Md. 657, 139 A. 2d 251
(1958) ; 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 299.
Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 158 A. 2d 80 (1960).
1 Stark, Social Security: Its Importance to Lawyers, 43 A.B.A.J. 319
(1957).
Title II of the Social Security Act of 1933 (49 STAT. 622) is found,
as amended, in 42 U.S.C.A. § 401 if. The more Important of the repeated
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also includes joint Federal-State programs of old-age as-
sistance, aid to the permanently and totally disabled, and
aid to dependent children, the insurance provisions of
Title II of the Social Security Act have taken on increasing
importance because they now apply to a larger number of
people than the other programs and because they have
become the backbone of the Social Security system of
benefits and protection to the nation's individuals and
families.' While the attention of contributors and their
dependents has necessarily centered on such practical mat-
ters as the amount of retirement benefits, and survivorship
protection and estate-planning, the legal status of the
benefits themselves has remained a persistent question.
The United States Supreme Court has been squarely con-
fronted with this issue in the case of Nestor v. Flemming8
Old-age, survivor's, and disability insurance may be
described as a system whereby employees, their employers,
and self-employed persons are taxed in proportion to
earnings4 to provide trust funds from which benefits are
payable. The requirements for eligibility for benefits are
contained in Title II of the Social Security Act.5 The em-
ployee or self-employed person is eligible at retirement
age for monthly old-age benefits if he has become "insured"
on the basis of his record of earnings which were covered
by Social Security. Title II also contains the requirements
which must be met by younger disabled workers to be-
come entitled to disability insurance benefits and the
amendments to Title II have been in 1939 (53 STAT. 1360), 1946 (60 STAT.
978), 1950 (64 STAT. 477), 1954 (68 STAT. 1052), 1956 (70 STAT. 807),
1957 (71 STAT. 518), 1958 (72 STAT. 938), 1960 (74 STAT. 927), and 1961
(75 STAT. 131).
2 In December, 1960, there were In current status 14,157,138 monthly
old-age and survivor's insurance benefits and 687,451 monthly benefits pay-
able to disabled insured persons and their dependents. In round figures,
old-age and survivor's benefits for that month totaled $888,320,500 and
disability insurance benefits $48,000,200. The combined total taxes col-
lected for old-age, survivor's, and disability insurance in the last calendar
quarter of 1960 amounted' to some $2,314,407,000, while the two trust funds
together amounted to more than $22,000,000,000 at the end of 1960. Some
comparable figures for other Social Security programs for December, 1960,
show $161,257,151 in old-age assistance payments to 2,332,067 recipients;
$25,288,855 to 373,925 recipients of aid to the permanently and totally
disabled; and $92,603,395 to 3,080,124 recipients of aid to dependent
children. 24 Soc. Sec. Bull. No. 8, pp. 20 if. (Aug. 1961).
8 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
'1954 I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3102, and 3111, as amended.
542 U.S.C.A. § 401 ff (1957). Under these sections, a person who meets
the specified conditions of eligibility is "entitled" to benefits If he files an
application with the Social Security Administration. The term "entitle-
ment" is used infra to indicate that a claimant has thus formally estab-
lished his eligibility to insurance benefits. As will appear, "entitlement"
does not necessarily Imply actual payment of benefits.
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requirements under which dependents of retired, disabled,
or deceased workers may qualify for benefits. The Act
provides, in addition to monthly survivor's benefits upon
an insured worker's death, a lump-sum death payment.
An important additional aspect of Title II is Section
203,6 which may prevent payment of benefits to a worker
who, after reaching retirement age, continues to have
substantial earnings. Title II also applies similar restric-
tions to recipients of most types of dependent's monthly
benefits. Although the "earnings test" has been repeatedly
liberalized by amendments to the Social Security Act, it
has, since the 1954 amendments,7 also been extended to
all types of earnings (including even some which may
not be taxed or credited for Social Security purposes).
Social Security coverage is thus in effect insurance against
retirement rather than against mere attainment of retire-
ment age or, in the case of dependents, against actual loss
of income resulting from the worker's death or retirement.
The 1954 amendments also introduced restrictions against
payment of benefits to certain classes of deported persons,"
while the 1956 amendments9 barred payments under some
circumstances to aliens residing abroad ° and to persons
convicted of subversive activities.1' We shall be particu-
larly concerned with the deportation provision, which re-
sulted in the Nestor case.
Ephram Nestor became entitled to old-age insurance
benefits in December, 1955, effective November, 1955, in the
642 U.S.C.A. § 403 (1957).
168 STAT. 1052 (1954).
8 § 202(n) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 402(n) (1957)]
reads in pertinent part as follows:
"(n) (1) If any individual Is (after the date of enactment of this
subsection) deported under paragraph (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7),
(10), (11), (12), (14), (15), (16), (17), or (18) of [section 241(a)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act] then, notwithstanding any
other provisions of this [title]-
(A) no monthly benefit under this section or section 223 shall be
paid to such individual, on the basis of his wages and self-employment
income, for any month occurring (I) after the month In which the
Secretary is notified by the Attorney General that such individual
has been so deported, and (ii) before the month in which such In-
dividual is thereafter lawfully admitted to the United States for
permanent residence,
(2) As soon as practicable after the deportation of any individual
under any of the paragraphs of [section 241 (a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act] enumerated In paragraph (1) in this subsection,
the Attorney General shall notify the Secretary of such deportation."
S70 STAT. 807 (1956).
1042 U.S.C.A. § 402(t) (1957).
U42 U.S.C.A. § 402(u) (1957).
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amount of $55.60 monthly. 2 In July, 1956, he was deported
to his native Bulgaria pursuant to Section 241 (a) (6) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act 13 for having been a
member of the Communist Party from 1933 to 1939. Under
Section 202 (n) of the Social Security Act, the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare was required to stop
Nestor's benefit payments upon receipt of notice from the
Attorney General that Nestor had been deported under
paragraph 6 of Section 241 (a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The Nestor case is concerned not with
the deportation itself but rather with the constitutionality
of Section 202(n) of the Social Security Act under which
Nestor's payments were stopped.
In Nestor v. Folsom,4 the District Court for the District
of Columbia held Section 202 (n) unconstitutional on the
ground that it deprived Nestor of an accrued property right
without due process of law as required by the Fifth Amend-
ment. From this decision the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare took a direct appeal.15 The Supreme
Court's decision, delivered by Justice Harlan, reversed the
District Court. Dissenting opinions were written by
12 The requirements for "entitlement" are found in § 202(a) of the Social
Security Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 402(a) (1957)], which provides:
"§ 202. (a) Every individual who-
(1) Is a fully insured individual (as defined in section 214(a)),
(2) has attained retirement age (as defined in section 216 (a)),
and
(3) has filed application for old-age insurance benefits or was en-
titled to disability insurance benefits for the month preceding the month
in which he attained the age of 65, shall be entitled to an old-age
insurance benefit...."
§ 241 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)
(1953) provides in pertinent part:
"Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall,
upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who-
(6) Is or at any time has been, after entry, a member of any of the
following classes of aliens:
(C) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (I) the Communist
Party of the United States; (ii) any other totalitarian party of the
United States; (iii) the Communist Political Association; (iv) the
Communist or any other totalitarian party of any State of the United
States, of any foreign state. or of any political or geographical sub-
division of any foreign state; (v) any section, subsidiary, branch,
affiliate, or subdivision of any such association or party, or (vi) the
direct predecessors or successors of any such association or party,
regardless of what name such group or organization may have used,
may now bear, or may hereafter adopt .... "
1'169 F. Supp. 922 (D.C.D.C. 1959), noted 19 Md. L. Rev. 267 (1959),
73 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (1960).1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (1949).
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Justice Black, Justice Brennan (with whom the Chief
Justice and Justice Douglas joined), and Justice Douglas."
After disposing of a preliminary jurisdictional ques-
tion, 7 the majority opinion proceeded to discuss the theory
of "accrued property rights," commencing with the flat
statement, "Appellee's right to Social Security benefits
cannot properly be considered to have been of that order.""s
The Court reviewed the statutory requirements for eligi-
bility, and particularly noted that both eligibility and the
amount of benefits depend on the earnings record of the
insured worker rather than on the amount of taxes which
have been paid. Terming the Social Security system "a
form of social insurance, enacted pursuant to Congress'
power to 'spend money in aid of the "general welfare," ' '"
the Court stated, "It is apparent that the noncontractual
interest of an employee covered by the Act cannot be
soundly analogized to that of the holder of an annuity,
whose right to benefits are bottomed on his contractual
premium payments."2 The Court also cited Section 1104
of the Social Security Act (contained in the Act since its
passage in 1935) to the effect that Congress expressly re-
served for itself "[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any
provision" of the Act,2' and stated that "[t]o engraft upon
the Social Security system a concept of 'accrued property
rights' would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in
adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it de-
mands."22
While concluding that "a person covered by the Act has
not such a right in benefit payments as would make every
defeasance of 'accrued' interests violative of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment," the Court stated
that "the interest of a covered employee under the Act is
of sufficient substance to fall within the protection from
arbitrary governmental action afforded by the Due Process
16 Nestor v. Flemming, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
1 The court was obliged to consider whether 28 U.S.C.A. § 2282 (1950)
required a three-judge district court to hear Nestor v. Folsom, supra, n. 14.
If this had been the case, it would have been necessary to remand the
case without reaching the merits. Finding that the action below, while It
drew in question the constitutionality of § 202(n) of the Social Security
Act, did not seek affirmatively to interdict the operation of a statutory
scheme, the court held that jurisdiction had been properly exercised
by the one-judge district court. 363 U.S. 603, 606-608 (1960).
- Id., 608.
19 A quotation from Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937), cited
at supra, n. 16, 609.
0 Supra, n. 16, 610.
2142 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (1957).
"Supra, n. 16, 610.
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Clause. [Nevertheless, Congress' conclusion that] the pub-
lic purse should not be utilized to contribute to the support
of those deported on the grounds specified in the statute
[was not] so lacking in rational justification as to offend
due process."2 3 The Court also was satisfied that, since one
of the Congressional motives in enacting 202 (n) may have
been to restrict the payment of benefits to persons living
abroad, such a motive may have existed entirely apart from
any desire to penalize deportees, and that Section 202(n)
cannot be considered punishment. Not being punishment,
202(n) cannot be considered an ex post facto law or bill
of attainder.
All three of the dissenting opinions stressed their
authors' conviction that Section 202 (n) is plainly punitive.
The opinion of Justice Brennan (with whom the Chief
Justice and Justice Douglas joined) confined itself to this
aspect. Justice Douglas' opinion is chiefly concerned with
showing that 202(n) is a bill of attainder, but makes
several references to property interest without defining
the nature of such interest.24
The dissent of Justice Black, on the other hand, while
stressing that Section 202 (n) is an ex post facto law and
bill of attainder, also disagreed sharply with the majority
by asserting that there is indeed a property interest here.
After referring, in his opening sentence, to Nestor's right
to old-age benefits as "statutory," Justice Black proceeded
to describe Nestor's insurance as "that for which he
has paid and which the Government promised to pay
him. '25 Justice Black was convinced that there is a close
0 Supra, n. 16, 611, 612.
m Justice Douglas referred to 202 (n) as "cutting off a person's livelihood
by denying him accrued social benefits. .. ." 363 U.S. 603, 630, and stated:
"Social Security payments are not gratuities. They are products of a
contributory system, the funds being raised by payment from em-
ployees and employers alike, or In the case of self-employed persons,
by the individual alone. * * * The funds are placed in the Federal
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund . . . and only those who
contribute to the fund are entitled to Its benefits, the amount of
benefits being related to the amount of contributions made." Supra, 631.
This statement, relating the amount of benefits 't the amount of con-
tributions, does not seem to accord with the law, which was more
accurately reflected In the majority opinion (where it was Indicated that
benefit-amounts are based on earnings records rather than contributions).
2 Supra, n. 16, 622. Justice Black's reference to a "statutory" right
demonstrates how difficult It is for even his outspoken dissent to escape
ambiguity. A statutory right, created by the legislature and presumably
revocable at its will, hardly seems to be the sort of right for which
Justice Black argues. In regard to the nature of statutory rights, see
11 Am. Jur. 1199, Constitutional Law, § 370: "A right cannot be regarded
as vested, In the constitutional sense, unless It amounts to something
more than a mere expectation of future benefit or interest founded upon an
anticipated continuance of the existing general laws."
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analogy here to the situation in Lynch v. United States,"
in which the court held invalid a statute repudiating
promises to make payments under the War Risk Insurance
Act of 1917.2"
Since the dissents (even, to some extent, that of Justice
Black) rely on the argument from due process, the ma-
jority's holding that Social Security benefits do not repre-
sent an accrued property right is more definitive than it
would at first seem. Nor is it profitable to argue that the
Court could not have considered Nestor's case in the light
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment unless
Nestor had had some sort of property interest at stake.
There is, at least in the majority's opinion, nothing to
indicate that the term "property" (as distinguished from
"life" and "liberty") is viewed as anything more than the
material reward which any recurring payment or bene-
fit obviously constitutes.
While there is no pretense here of an exhaustive dis-
cussion of the history of the Social Security Act in the
courts, a brief consideration of earlier decisions will help
to place the Nestor decision in its proper perspective.28
The initial judicial test of Social Security occurred in
1937 when the Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Davis,"
found the provisions for benefits in Title II not to violate
the Tenth Amendment. To reach this conclusion, the Court
relied on Congress' power to spend money in aid of the
general welfare, and conceded that Congress had discretion
in wielding this power, citing the desperate plight of the
aged in times of depression. The Court (and here Justice
Cardozo's reasoning suggested that in Nestor) found the
problem to be national in scope:
"Moreover, laws of the separate states cannot deal
with it effectively. Congress, at least, had a basis for
that belief. * ** Whether wisdom or unwisdom reside
292 U.S. 571 (1934).
The tone of Justice Black's criticism becomes severe where he says:
"The people covered by this Act are now able to rely with complete
assurance on the fact that they will be compelled to contribute regu-
larly to this fund whenever each contribution falls due. I believe
they are entitled to rely with the same assurance on getting the benefits
they have paid for and have been promised, when their disability or
age makes their insurance payable under the terms of the law." 363
U.S. 603, 624 (1960).
2 The present discussion is limited to property rights contained in the
Social Security Act, as that statute has been elucidated upon by certain
court decisions culminating In Nestor. For a significant article which
employs particularly the legislative history of Social Security, see Wollen-
burg, Vested Rights in Social Security Benefits, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 299 (1958),
cited In Nestor v. Flemming, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960).
=301 U.S. 619 (1937).
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in the scheme of benefits set forth in Title II, it is not
for us to say. The answer to such inquiries must come
from Congress, not the courts. Our concern here, as
often, is with power, not with wisdom."80
The Court went on to find the tax on employers 3 a valid
excise (relying on the reasoning in Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis,32 handed down the same day).
Not until Nestor was the Supreme Court again required
to treat the property interest in Social Security benefits,
but in the interval the lower courts were chronically faced
with the problem. In Beers v. Federal Security Adminis-
trator,3 the legal representative of the estate of a de-
ceased Social Security beneficiary brought action to re-
cover the amount of ten uncashed checks representing the
decedent's monthly retirement benefits and found in the
decedent's possession at death. The court of appeals, sus-
taining the district court, held that the representative was
entitled to the proceeds of the checks. Checks, being freely
transferable, were held to pass by operation of law on death
to the executor or administrator. 34
In the same year as the Beers case came Ewing v.
Risher. 5 Risher, a wage earner, had applied for monthly
retirement benefits in June, 1941, but his claim had been
disallowed because his earnings record did not show he
was insured. Risher died in 1942. In June, 1946, the Bureau
of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance made a determination
that Risher was an employee and that he had been insured.
In July of that year, Mary Risher, the widow and plaintiff,
filed application for widow's monthly insurance benefits.
Since a statutory requirement for entitlement was the
filing of an application, and since the law at that time
provided that such an application could be retroactively
Id., 644. Emphasis added.
This tax was originally found in Title VIII of the Social Security Act,
but is now in the Internal Revenue Code, 1954 I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3102, and
3111, as amended.
301 U.S. 548 (1937). This decision held the unemployment compensa-
tion provisions of Title III to be separable from the tax In Title IX for
their effectuation. The Court insisted that their conclusion that Title IX
would stand without Title III would have been reached even If the
Social Security Act had not contained a severability clause. For this
clause, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1303 (1957) : "If any provision of this Act, or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby."
172 F. 2d 34 (2d Cir. 1949).
The court took cognizance of § 207 of the Social Security Act [42
U.S.C.A. § 407 (1957)] forbidding assignment of future payments made
under Title II, but considered it inapplicable to the issue.
176 F. 2d 641 (10th Cir. 1949).
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effective for no more than three months before the month
it was filed, the plaintiff was unable to receive a benefit for
any month before April, 1946. Moreover, the statute re-
quired that application for the lump-sum death payment
be filed within two years after the worker's death. The
Bureau determined that the plaintiff could not qualify for
a lump-sum death payment and that there were to be no
monthly benefits payable for months from February, 1944
(the month in which she had attained age 65) through
March, 1946. The court of appeals, in refusing to reverse
the Bureau and the district court, advanced a doctrine of
"creative right. '30 Where the requirements of the statute
were not met, the court stated, the substantive right of the
claimant to benefits and the corresponding liability of
the Government ended.3 7
The following year the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit took a different approach to benefit rights in
Ewing v. Gardner.85 Like Beers v. Federal Security Ad-
ministrator, this case was a suit by the legal representative
of a deceased insured worker. The decedent, having at-
tained age 65 on July 11, 1944, had filed an application for
monthly benefits but failed to furnish the proof of age
which was requested. His claim was disallowed by the
Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance under a regu-
lation providing that an applicant's disregard for one year
of a request for evidence should constitute abandonment of
his claim. 9 In 1946 the wage earner died, and his executor,
Gardner, filed proof of the decedent's age, claiming the
monthly benefits for which the decedent himself had ap-
plied in 1944. The court of appeals, affirming the lower
court's decision, held that the decedent had been entitled
to benefits under the Social Security Act (whose express
requirement was that the claimant have attained retire-
ment age, not that he have submitted proof of it). The right
1 "The rule is well settled that where a statute creates a right, such as
the one in this case, unknown to the common law, and limits the time
within which the right must be asserted, the limitation defines and
controls the right and the right ceases to exist if not asserted within the
time fixed in the statute therefor." Id., 644.
' The court rejected the appellee's contention that she had been misled
by the Bureau's action in disallowing her husband's claim. Appellee knew
that her husband had had an appeal pending in his case when he died, and
by law she was bound to know she must apply for the lump-sum death
payment within two years.
S185 F. 2d 781 (6th Cir. 1950), rev'd as to taxation of costs, 341 U.S.
321 (1951).
Social Security Regulations No. 3, § 403.704(b) (20 C.F.R. § 403.704(b))
(later amended). The Court stated that this regulation was not neces-
sarily invalid If contrued as dismissing without prejudice a proceeding
to enforce existing rights.
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to benefits accrued, said the appellate court, when proof
was filed. Furnishing proof was a condition precedent to
payment, not to governmental liability. Finding that the
executor could enforce this claim, the court added, "The
right of the wage-earner to the primary benefit is not a
gratuity, but is a property right which can be enforced by
court action. 40
In Canfield v. Ewing,41 the district court affirmed the
holding of a referee of the Social Security Administration
that deductions might be made from benefits on account of
the plaintiff's refusal to give any information about his
current net earnings from self-employment. The plaintiff's
ground for objection was that his benefit was based on his
former earnings as an employee and that his profits from
self-employment after retirement age would not cause
deductions except for the 1950 amendments to the Social
Security Act.42 As we shall see, the provisions of the law
for deductions because of earnings after entitlement have
produced further litigation.
In Coy v. Folsom,4" the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit refused to extend the Gardner decision reached in
the Sixth Circuit. In Coy, the plaintiff was the widow and
executrix of the insured worker. The decedent had been
sick and not mentally competent to handle his affairs, but
he had not been declared legally incompetent, and no
guardian had been appointed for him. He had failed to file
application to establish entitlement to retirement bene-
fits. The plaintiff, relying on arguments from the law of
private insurance, urged that the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare was obliged to treat as done what
should have been done and to award benefits for 27 months
before the month of the insured's death. The court, citing
the Risher decision,44 viewed the filing of application as a
condition precedent to creation of an obligation on the part
of the United States and upheld the Secretary.45
Supra, n. 38, 784.
'108 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
264 STAT. 477 (1950). These amendments extended coverage to self-
employed businessmen, thus making their net earnings includable for
computing benefits and also cause for deductions from benefits.
"228 F. 2d 276 (3d Cir. 1955).
"Supra, n. 35.
"Here there can be no vested Interest in the decedent's estate to
old-age benefits. * * * It is clear that the Social Security Act has
many facets completely unrelated to private insurance contracts or
transactions. An examination of the whole statute demonstrates that
Congress worked out a complete, yet carefully guarded, system in-
tended to confer specific coverage for the aged under the conditions
provided by the statute." Supra, n. 43, 278-279.
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The judicial background for the Nestor case includes,
finally, Mullowney v. Folsom.46 The plaintiff in this case
became entitled as of April, 1950, to a retirement benefit
which, under the amendments to the Social Security Act
later in the same year,47 became subject to deductions for
self-employment earnings beginning in 1951. The plaintiff
argued that he had a vested right to receive the payments
awarded in 1950 and increased by the 1950 amendments
and that the section of the amendments which provided
deductions for self-employment earnings was unconstitu-
tional. The court upheld the constitutionality of the
amended law, deciding that the plaintiff had not, by his
award, acquired a vested right in the benefit. The court,
with citations to Helvering v. Davis48 and Steward Ma-
chine Co. v. Davis,49 reasoned that social security payments
are made out of the general treasury and financed by col-
lections made from employers and employees, and that
payments made as a result of Congressional appropriation
have not thus far been construed as contractual in nature.50
The court also cited Section 1104 of the Social Security Act,
which reserves to Congress the right to amend the Act.5
The district court's decision in the Nestor case held
Section 202 (n) of the Social Security Act to be a denial,
without due process, of an accrued property right. Judge
Tamm, in his opinion, conceded the right or power of
Congress to amend the Act and the need for flexibility in
the Act to deal with a national economy which itself
changes. But, he continued:
"[T]o say that Congress has the right through its legis-
lative enactments to cope with certain problems that
may continually arise and that are relative to the
purpose for which the Act was passed is one thing,
but is an entirely different thing to say that Congress
while legislating and purportedly in accordance with
the basic designs and purposes for which the Act was
originally passed, can or many deprive a person of a
property right.... 52
156 F. Supp. 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
17 Supra, n. 42.
- 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
0 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
w Norman v. B. & 0. R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) ; Ewing v. Risher, 8upra,
n. 35.
-42 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (1957).
52 169 F. Supp. 922, 934 (D.C.D.C. 1959).
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To Judge Tamm this case was distinguishable from the
Risher decision 53 because Nestor had fulfilled the conditions
precedent to entitlement. 4
In view of most of the justices (including several dis-
senters) in Nestor v. Flemming that Social Security bene-
fits are not accrued property rights was in line with the
present law as it has developed from the 1935 Act by re-
peated amendments and as it has generally been inter-
preted by the courts. As we have seen, the Court in
Helvering v. Davis55 justified Title II of the original Act
by citing the Congressional power to spend money in aid
of the general welfare. The Court simultaneously approved
the taxes on employers and employees without regard to
their purpose. Congressional amendments have repeatedly
brought new groups of workers under the system, making
provision for the older persons in these groups to stand on
much the same footing as workers who had been covered
for many years.
As already noted, the lower courts have tended to up-
hold these exercises of Congressional power to amend
against the repeated attacks of litigants who, as in the
Risher"0 and Canfield5 7 cases, were unwilling to concede
that benefits were payable only under the conditions im-
posed by Congress, or who, as in Mullowney,5 8 objected to
the effect of amendments upon their right to receive pay-
ments.5 19 If the wording in Gardner ° indicated a concept of
property rights in benefits, that case may be seen as going
against the main stream. The facts in the Nestor case are
harsher than those in the Mullowney case"' or in Price
v. Flemming2 (in each of which the plaintiff might ex-
pect to later receive payments). But, like the rights of the
-176 F. 2d 641 (1949).
14 Where Judge Tamm relied on Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp.
590 (Ct. Ci. 1958), be seemed more In accord with the Supreme Court's
handling of the Nestor case.
Supra, n. 48.
176 F. 2d 641 (10th Cir. 1949).
108 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
156 F. Supp. 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
A case, analogous to Mullowney, Is Price v. Flemming, 280 F. 2d 956
(3d Cir. 1960), cert. den. 365 U.S. 817 (1961), where the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit cited Nestor v. Flemming, barely five weeks after
it was decided, to reject the plaintiff's argument that his earnings as an
attorney should not have been made cause for deductions by the 1954
amendments. The plaintiff had relied on the district court's decision in
Nestor v. Folsom, 169 F. Supp. 922 (D.C.D.C. 1959), noted 19 Md. L. Rev.
267 (1959), 73 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (1960).
185 F. 2d 781 (6th Cir. 1950).
Supra, n. 58.
Supra, n. 59.
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plaintiffs in Mullowney and Price, Nestor's right to bene-
fits is a statutory right, and subject (within the bounds
of Due Process) to the effects of Congressional amendment.
It would be difficult and fruitless to speculate as to what
restraint might have been placed on Congressional amend-
ment of the Social Security Act had Nestor been decided
otherwise. The Nestor decision indicates that the pattern of
recurrent amendments which have characterized the his-
tory of the Social Security Act since 1939 can withstand
challenge in the highest court. In particular, Nestor
demonstrates that Congress is not constitutionally limited
to agreeable changes in the law. The amendments to the
original Act have for the most part increased benefits (as
an adjustment to drastic increases in the cost of living)
or provided benefits or insurance coverage on more gen-
erous terms to larger and larger groups of workers. It
is understandable why the issue in Nestor has been so long
in reaching the Supreme Court, since past amendments
have not represented the type of change most likely to
stimulate challenge in the courts. Nor is there any indi-
cation that future amendments will deprive any substan-
tial group of contributors of the benefits they anticipate.
Even beyond the possible meaning of this case for the
Congressional right to amend existing provisions of the
law, we may anticipate that Nestor will be cited in the
chronic political and philosophic controversy which has
gathered around the Social Security program. Some op-
ponents of the term "insurance", as used to describe the
program, have already suggested that Nestor may serve as
ammunition to emphasize the differences between Social
Security and private contractual insurance. Against these
are ranged defenders who point to "social insurance" as an
accepted term in our language.6 3
"See the statement of Carlyle M. Dunaway, General Counsel, National
Association of Life Underwriters, 55 National Association News 69, 70
(1960) :
"As we see it, the decision [in the Nestor case] could prove extremely
helpful to NALU In its current campaign to persuade Congress to
delete all insurance terminology from the Social Security Act and
to insert in the Act a forthright declaration that the Social Security
program is not, and is not to be represented as, an insurance program."
As evidence that the argument against use of the word "insurance" is not
new, see Staff Report to Chairman of Subcommittee on Social Security of
Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Social Security
After 18 Years, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 3741 (1954). The statement of the
Democratic members of the subcommittee, issued at that time, takes the
opposite view that social insurance is one part of the field of insurance.
For the latter view, see also the article by Prof. J. Edward Hedges, Uni-
versity of Indiana, Insurance, 12 ENCYLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (1960 ed.), 454-
456.
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When the Social Security system was planned, it was
decided that the part which would in the future be most
basic and inclusive should be financed from contributions
of workers and their employers. The size of the benefits
payable to the contributor or his dependents was to bear
some relation to the amount of his earnings which had been
subject to the Social Security tax. The same principles
were later applied to the self-employed. It is under-
standable that American workers and their employers, and
the self-employed, feel a justifiable sense of participation
- and even ownership - in the social insurance system to
which they have contributed. 4 The contributory nature of
the system would certainly seem to impose on Congress
certain moral obligations to the contributors. This moral
obligation (which continues beyond the term of the in-
dividual legislator and even beyond the life of the indi-
vidual contributor) is to devote to the payment of benefits,
by direct expenditure or by investment, the amount of
the contributions. The Nestor decision should make it clear
that this moral obligation does not give to insured per-
sons and their dependents the kind of legal rights which
characterize private contractual insurance. Rather, the par-
ticipants in Social Security must rely on that Court's as-
surance that any changes in their present or potential
benefits must not conflict with the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment and must have the approval of
public opinion which can be reflected at Congressional
elections.
Real Property Held By Tenants By The Entirety
As The 'Subject Of An Advancement
Barron v. Janney'
An aged couple owned a tract of land adjacent to the
family farm as tenants by the entireties. They improved
the tract by remodeling an old school house thereon into
which their daughter, the defendant, moved in 1953. In
1957 the parents jointly conveyed by deed all their interest
"That there is such a sense of ownership can hardly be doubted when,
for example, the recent Congressional and public controversy over health
care for the aged is observed. The proponents of hospitalization benefits
as a part of the social Insurance system very emphatically insist that such
benefits would not be "charity" but rather an earned right.
1225 Md. 228, 170 A. 2d 176 (1961).
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